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Ricci v. DeStefano: What It Means for Public Employers
By Ronald Kramer

I. Introduction
While the public perhaps knows more
about Ricci v. DeStefano1 for Justice
Sotomayor's involvement, public employers understand Ricci has a far
greater impact than fodder for the 24hour news cycle. In Ricci, the Supreme
Court addressed and decided an issue
that many public employers are forced
to address: What does an employer do
with an employment testing process
where, despite its best efforts to make
it non-discriminatory, the test results
demonstrate it had a disparate impact
on minorities? Can the employer
throw out the test and try again? Does
the employer violate Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “Act”) if it
does? Will it violate the Act if it does
not?
The Court has attempted to balance
the Act's prohibitions on intentional
and disparate impact discrimination
by permitting an employer to take
actions that otherwise would be
considered intentionally discriminatory where it has a “strong basis in
evidence” to believe that it would face
disparate impact liability if it did not
do so. For New Haven, Connecticut
(the “City”), that meant its decision
not to certify tests violated the Act
because the City lacked a strong basis
in evidence to believe it would face
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disparate impact liability.
Public employers now have a
standard they can rely upon when
faced with this situation. Whether
any employer can apply the standard
with any confidence that it will not be
sued and, if sued, that it will be
successful, is another question. Yet
public employers must learn the
lessons of Ricci, for its effects extend
far beyond promotions and its full
impact has yet to be seen.

II. The Facts
The City of New Haven is the lead
player in what could be considered a
modern Greek tragedy.2 It wanted to
do the right thing, to run objective fire
lieutenant and captain promotional
tests that would be completely nondiscriminatory and also comply with:
(i) civil service rules setting forth a
rule of three for promotions; and (ii) a
union collective bargaining agreement requiring that sixty percent of
the exam be the results of a written
test and the remaining forty percent
be an oral exam.3 The City hired an
experienced outside consulting firm,
Industrial/Organizational Solutions
(IOS), to develop and administer the
examinations.4
IOS performed job analyses, interviewed employees, did questionnaires,
and even engaged in ride-alongs in
developing the test. At every stage,
IOS over sampled minority firefighters
to ensure that the results would not
unintentionally favor white appli-
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cants.5 For the written exam, all of
the questions came from Cityapproved training manuals and
applicants were told the chapters from
which questions were drawn and given
ample time to study.6
From the job analyses, IOS drafted
hypothetical firefighting situations to
test applicants in the oral exam. To
staff the nine three-member assessor
panels, IOS retained experienced
higher ranking fire officers from
similar, out-of-state departments.
IOS trained them on how to
administer the exam, and each panel
consisted of a Caucasian, Hispanic,
and an African-American.7
Despite the City's efforts, the test
results showed the process had a
disparate impact on minorities. For
the lieutenant's exam, forty-three
whites, nineteen blacks and fifteen
Hispanics completed the exam, yet
twenty-five whites (58.1 percent),
sixteen blacks (31.6 percent) and
thirteen Hispanics (20 percent) passed.
For the captain's exam, twenty-five
whites, eight blacks and eight
Hispanics completed the exam, yet
sixteen whites (64 percent), three
blacks (37.5 percent) and three
Hispanics (37.5 percent) passed.8 The
disparities fell well below the eighty
percent standard set by the EEOC to
implement the Act's disparate impact
provisions.9 Moreover, given the civil
service rule requiring that promotions
be made from the top three candidates,
if the promotion lists were certified, all
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eight vacant lieutenant positions
would be filled by whites, and of the
seven captain vacancies, at best two
Hispanics and no blacks could be
promoted.10
City officials were concerned, and
the City's Civil Service Board (CSB)
held five meetings/hearings over

Ronald Kramer
Ronald J. Kramer is a Partner with
the Chicago office of Seyfarth Shaw
LLP, where he practices in the areas of
labor and employment law. Mr.
Kramer is responsible for advising and
representing private and public sector
employers in a wide range of labor and
employment matters, including employment discrimination charges,
investigations, settlements and lawsuits, union organizing drives and
unfair labor practice charges, grievance and arbitration cases under
collective bargaining agreements,
collective bargaining negotiations,
interest arbitration, handbook review,
employee disciplinary matters, FLSA
questions, and ERISA/employee benefit lawsuits. He has also served as
chief negotiator in collective bargaining negotiations for numerous clients
in their negotiations with such unions
as the Laborers, IUOE, Painters,
Teamsters, UFCW, USWA, AFSCME,
IAFF, FOP, CCPA, and MAP. He is a
member of the Chicago, Illinois State,
and American Bar Associations and
currently serves as the chair of the
Government Operations Committee of
the ABA’s Section of State and Local
Government Law. He received his
B.A. from Michigan State University
magna cum laude and his J.D. with
high honors from IIT/Chicago-Kent
College of Law. He is admitted to the
state bar of Illinois, U.S. district
courts for the Northern District of
Illinois, Western District of Wisconsin
and the Eastern District of Michigan,
and the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth
Circuit Courts of Appeal.

Winter 2010
whether to certify the results.11 City
officials presented evidence, as did
firefighters (for and against), representatives of the local union and the
International Association of Black
Firefighters.12 The CSB further invited three other witnesses to provide
additional opinions. The first, an IOS
competitor, claimed that the results
showed a very high disparate impact,
but admitted the disparity was
generally within the range of what he
sees professionally. He made several
suggestions to improve the process,
including changing the weights given
to the portions of the exam, and
possibly in the future running an
assessment center instead.13 The
second witness, an African American
federal fire program specialist who
also was a retired Michigan fire
captain, opined that the applicants
should have known the materials upon
which they were questioned. He
concluded any disparate impact was
likely due to whites outperforming
some minorities on testing or because
more whites took the exam.14 The final
witness, a college professor whose
primary field of expertise was not
firefighting, but race and culture as
they influence performance on tests,
opined that no matter what test the
City used it would have revealed a
disparity.15
After hearing the evidence, the CSB
did not certify the test results.16
Plaintiffs, seventeen white firefighters
and one Hispanic, brought suit,
alleging among other claims violations
of the Act and the 14th Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.17 The district court ruled for the City on
summary judgment, finding that the
City's “motivation to avoid making
promotions based on a test with a
racially disparate impact . . . does not,
as a matter of law, constitute
discriminatory intent under Title
VII.”18 The court determined that the
City's actions were not “based on race”
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since all applicants took the same test,
and thus the result was the same for
all when the results were discarded.19
The Second Circuit affirmed the
decision in a now famous oneparagraph opinion,20 and a petition for
rehearing en banc was narrowly
denied.21

III. The Decision
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
reversed,22 finding that the City had
violated Title VII by failing to certify
the test results.23 The Court believed
that the City's actions violated Title
VII’s disparate-treatment prohibitions
“absent some valid defense.”24 The
Court rejected the lower court's
finding of no discriminatory action,
declaring that the decision not to
certify the examination results because of the statistical disparity based
on race was violative race-based
decision-making:
Whatever the City’s ultimate aim
– however well intentioned or
benevolent it might have seemed –
the City made its employment
decision because of race. The City
rejected the test results solely
because the higher scoring candidates were white. The question is
not whether that conduct was
discriminatory but whether the
City had a lawful justification for
its race-based action.25
The Court then considered when an
employer can take a race-based action
to avoid possibly engaging in unlawful
disparate treatment. The Court rejected claims that it would never be
appropriate to take action to avoid a
disparate treatment violation, because
the Act prohibits both types of conduct
and must therefore be interpreted to
give effect to both provisions.26 Nor did
it accept claims that such a defense
should only work if the employer was
“in fact” in violation of the Act's
disparate treatment prohibition, for
that would run counter with Congress's
intent to encourage employers to
voluntarily comply with the Act.27

IPER REPORT
Similarly, the Court rejected claims
that an employer’s “good faith belief”
should be sufficient to justify raceconscious conduct.28 The majority felt
this approach would go too far,
especially since Congress when it
codified disparate impact prohibitions
in the 1991 Civil Rights Act made no
exception for disparate treatment
actions taken in good faith to avoid
disparate impact violations. The Court
feared such a minimal standard would
encourage race-based action at the
slightest hint of disparate impact, give
rise to a de facto quota system where
results were tossed based solely on
statistics, and could give license to
employers to toss results where they
did not comport with their preferred
racial balance.29
Instead, the Court looked to
precedent under the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment for a
standard that “strikes a more
appropriate balance” when reconciling
competing obligations.30 There, “certain governmental actions to remedy
past racial discrimination – actions
that themselves are based on race –
are constitutional only where there is
a ‘strong basis in evidence’ that the
remedial actions were necessary.”31
This standard met the Court's goals of
giving effect to and reconciling both
the Act's disparate treatment and
disparate impact provisions while
encouraging employers to voluntarily
comply with the law without giving
them license to make race-based
decisions at will:
Applying the strong-basis-in-evidence standard to Title VII gives
effect to both the disparatetreatment and disparate-impact
provisions, allowing violations of
one in the name of compliance with
the other only in certain, narrow
circumstances.The standard leaves
ample room for employers' voluntary compliance efforts, which are
essential to the statutory scheme
and to Congress's efforts to
eradicate workplace discrimination. . . . And the standard
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appropriately constrains employers’ discretion in making racebased decisions: It limits that
discretion to cases in which there
is a strong basis in evidence of
disparate-impact liability, but it is
not so restrictive that it allows
employers to act only when there is
a provable, actual violation.
Resolving the statutory conflict in
this way allows the disparateimpact prohibition to work in a
manner that is consistent with
other provisions of Title VII,
including the prohibition on
adjusting employment-related test
scores on the basis of race. See [42
U.S.C.] § 2000e-2(l). ]32
Under that standard, the Court
found that the City had violated the
Act, for the record "makes clear there
is no support for the conclusion that
respondents had an objective, strong
basis in evidence to find the tests
inadequate, with some consequent
disparate impact liability in violation
of Title VII."33 While admittedly the
significant adverse impact here
constituted a prima facie case of
disparate impact liability, that and
nothing more "is far from a strong
basis in evidence that the City would
have been liable under Title VII had it
certified the results."34 The City could
only have been liable for disparate
impact discrimination if, in addition,
the exams were not job related and
consistent with business necessity, or
if there existed an equally valid, lessdiscriminatory alternative that served
the City's needs but that the City
refused to adopt.35
Here the examinations were jobrelated and consistent with business
necessity.36 With regard to valid lessdiscriminatory alternatives, the Court
rejected, among others: (i) utilizing a
different composite score (scores were
contractual, no basis to conclude this
was an equally valid alternative that
could have been adopted), (ii) reinterpreting the "rule of three" to provide for
banding (if done after knowing the
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results the City would have violated
Title VII's prohibition on adjusting
test results based on race); and (iii) the
use of assessment centers (the record
reference of this possibility did not
raise a factual question as to whether
the option was available or if it would
have had a less adverse impact).37
Discarding the tests was violative, and
"[f]ear of litigation alone cannot justify
an employer's reliance on race to the
detriment of individuals who passed
the examinations and qualified for
promotions."38
The dissent challenged the
majority's attempt to place the core
directives ("twin pillars") of Title VII –
disparate impact and disparate treatment – at odds with each other.39 The
dissent rejected the idea that an
employer that changes an employment practice in an effort to comply
with the Act’s disparate impact
provision acts “because of race.”
Instead, the dissent would hold that an
employer who jettisons a selection
device when its disproportionate racial
impact becomes apparent does not
violate the disparate treatment bar
automatically or at all, provided the
“employer must have good cause to
believe the device would not withstand
examination for business necessity.”40
The dissent also attacked the
strong-basis-in-evidence standard. The
dissent questioned the utility of the
standard, given that the Equal
Protection Clause lacks a similar
disparate impact component, and the
distinguishable cases upon which the
majority relied involved constitutional
challenges to absolute racial preferences where race was the decisive
factor.41 The dissent took issue with
the standard itself, the lack of
elaboration on how it was to be applied,
and how the lack of certainty may
discourage voluntary compliance.42
The dissent warned that any employer
attempting to meet this standard
could expect costly disparate treatment litigation where its chances for
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success would be “highly problematic.”
Indeed, the dissent questioned how
this standard was any different from
requiring the employer to establish a
provable, actual violation against
itself, something justices have frowned
upon in the past.43
The dissent believed the City had
ample "good cause" to believe its
selection process was flawed and thus
did not violate Title VII.44 In
particular, the dissent attacked the
City's blind use of the contractually
mandated testing requirements and
weighting, when apparently no consideration was given to determining
whether either the tests or their
weighting were likely to identify the
most qualified candidates. The dissent
cited evidence that assessment centers
were commonplace and better able to
identify the qualified candidates, as
well as precedent demonstrating that
written exams were not probative of a
firefighter's leadership and fire skills.45
The dissent also took issue with the
City's constraints on the exams'
creation, which deprived the City of
possible alternatives such as an
assessment center, and prevented the
consultant from its usual practice of
showing the written test to actual City
fire officials to insure the questions
were truly appropriate for the City.46
In light of these and other factors the
dissent believed City had good cause to
believe its testing process would not
withstand a disparate impact claim.47

IV. Decisions Since Ricci
Cases since Ricci have yet to apply the
new defense in a disparate treatment,
disparate impact case. Two early
cases, however, are of note. First, in
United States v. City of New York,48 a
district court found on summary
judgment that the New York City's
written firefighter examinations violated the Act's disparate impact
provision. The court made a point of
emphasizing that Ricci was not
controlling as to whether a testing
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process “actually had” a disparate
impact on minority candidates, and
that the City of New York had taken
significantly fewer steps than New
Haven to validate its exam.49 No
doubt, however, employers facing
disparate impact claims will try to
analogize their hiring processes to
New Haven's.
Second, Ricci already has been
utilized as support for ending a
consent decree to correct prior
discrimination. In Cleveland Fire
Fighters for Fair Hiring Practices v.
City of Cleveland,50 the court was
asked to extend the City’s time to
comply with a consent decree dating
back to 1977 (and amended thereafter)
to increase the ratio of minority
firefighters. Over the years the city
had increased its minority firefighter
percentage from four percent to
twenty-six percent, but due to
economically caused layoffs and state
pension changes that encouraged
firefighters not to retire, the City was
not able to meet the hiring and
diversity goals of the latest amended
decree.51 The City and other interested
parties sought an extension of the
decree, and others argued the decree
should expire. The parties actually
agreed to extend the decree to 2014,52
but the court at a status on the very
day Ricci issued53 advised the parties
that the proposed stipulation was
unacceptable, and that if a new
proposal was not submitted it would
rule on the competing motions.
When the parties could not reach
agreement, the court terminated the
case. The court considered its case
similar to Ricci, in that “what is
integral here is the administration of
an examination, as part of an overall
hiring process, that is fair to all people
– regardless of race.54 The court saw
Ricci as a reminder of how far the
nation has come from the origination
of affirmative action in the 1960s, how
much progress has been made in
places like Cleveland, and how courts
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struggle to find the proper balance to
ensure equal opportunity between
minorities and non-minorities alike.55
Here, the court found that the City had
made a good faith effort to comply with
the remedy designed to correct past
discrimination, circumstances beyond
its control caused it to fall short of the
consent decree's goal, the City had in
place a nondiscriminatory hiring
procedure that will be fair to all and
that will lead to increased minority
hiring, and, therefore, judicial monitoring was no longer necessary.56 The
court also recognized that, had it
accepted the parties’ agreed extension,
the decree would have been in place for
41 years since the case had first been
filed – i.e., “no one that would be
affected by the intervention of this
Court would even have been born at
the time the case was filed.”57

V. Lessons From Ricci
How long Ricci will remain the law is
anyone's guess given it is yet another
5-4 decision, and Congress has become
active in changing decisions it does not
like. Public employers, however, must
assume that Ricci will remain the law,
and recognize and learn from the
decision.
Lesson 1:
The time to develop and evaluate an
examination process to insure it is
non-discriminatory, has no disparate
impact, and is job-related and consistent with business necessity is
before the exam is implemented.

Above all, Ricci reminds employers
that the time to develop, evaluate and
validate a test to insure it is job
related, non-discriminatory, and does
not disadvantage minorities is before a
test is administered. As the Court
recognized: “Title VII does not prohibit
an employer from considering, before
administering a test or practice, how
to design that test or practice in order
to provide a fair opportunity for all
individuals, regardless of their race.”58
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To the extent New Haven erred, it was
by trying to throw out the test after it
had already been given.59 Modifying
the scoring or results after the fact
similarly would have been found
violative.
Employers should take steps to
avoid disparities in test results before
a test is implemented. Among many
options: (1) establish a pilot program
to assess whether the early returns
suggest an adverse impact; (2) engage
a testing expert who can provide
background on which types of test tend
to produce disparate impacts; (3) build
more flexibility into the process, such
as by limiting the weight given to
written exams or establishing bands
for test results to give the employer
more leeway and discretion. Employers should work with testing professionals to insure whatever process
ultimately adopted is validated.
Granted, it may not always be
possible to accurately assess whether a
test will statistically disadvantage a
protected group before implementation. Extra precautions taken on the
front end, however, will at least help
defend against a disparate impact
claim. To this end, employers also
should closely examine which test
would best reflect on the skills needed
for the job. Employers should not
assume that a test is legitimate simply
because another community uses the
same test for a similar position, or
because a union contract dictates the
process. Each test must be narrowly
crafted to fit the job requirements.
Lesson 2:
The defense goes both ways
At the end of its opinion, the
majority provided New Haven a "silver
lining" in its decision:
Our holding today clarifies how
Title VII applies to resolve
competing expectations under the
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions. If, after it
certifies the test results, the City
faces a disparate-impact suit, then
in light of our holding today it
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should be clear that the City
would avoid disparate-impact
liability based on the strong basis
in evidence that, had it not
certified the results, it would have
been subject to disparate-treatment liability.60
Thus, an employer facing disparate
impact claims apparently also may
raise a defense that it promoted or
hired people based on the tests because
it had a strong basis in evidence that,
had it not done so, it would have been
liable for disparate treatment.
Assuming that the majority is
correct, and that one need not actually
prove a violation to meet the strong
basis in evidence test, does this give an
employer in close cases the license to
decide what it wants to do, as opposed
to what may actually be the right
decision legally? After all, in a close
case wouldn't there be a strong basis in
evidence that a violation occurred
under either a disparate impact or a
disparate treatment theory? Courts
will have to address this.
Lesson 3:
The dissent has a point. What
will it take to demonstrate a
strong basis in evidence?
The Ricci Court held that an
employer could throw out test results
based on race only if it had a “strong
basis in evidence” that (1) its test was
“deficient” and (2) “discarding the
results [was] necessary to avoid
violating the disparate impact clause.”61
Even though the test results reflected
a significant racial imbalance, and the
City held multiple meetings wherein it
received feedback that the test
potentially could be improved, the
Court still found no genuine issue of
material fact that there was no “strong
basis in evidence” to justify discarding
the test. While the majority expressly
rejected finding an employer can avoid
liability only if it can prove disparate
impact discrimination would have
occurred, the dissent argues that that
may ultimately be what it takes to
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meet the strong basis in evidence
standard.
Given the lack of explanation as to
what may be required, lower courts
eventually will have to decide how
much an employer will need to reach
the “strong basis in evidence”
standard. In the meantime, a public
employer facing test results demonstrating a prima facie case of disparate
impact discrimination is, after Ricci,
in not much better shape than New
Haven in terms of its options. Any
action taken likely will lead to
litigation, and the employer will be
forced to decide whether to defend the
test or defend the decision to ignore the
test. In either case, apparently, the
employer can raise this new defense –
but that again begs the question of
proof.
If an employer fears litigation, it
should develop a portfolio of evidence
reflecting that it has a “strong basis” to
believe that it would be liable if it did
not take the action it did. The
employer will likely want to retain a
recognized testing expert to carefully
review the test program and test
results, analyze testing alternatives,
and issue a full report. The employer
also may wish to hire an experienced
labor and employment attorney (or
even a retired judge) to obtain a legal
opinion as to whether it likely would be
liable, and be prepared to waive the
privilege and rely on that report if
sued. The goal is to develop a solid
evidentiary case that the employer had
no choice but to take the action it did or
else be liable for discrimination.
Lesson 4:
Ricci extends beyond
promotions
Ricci's analysis extends beyond
promotions to any situation where
disparate impact applies. Hiring
processes clearly are covered, and as in
Cleveland Fire Fighters, the rationale
even may be of use in evaluating
ongoing consent decrees regarding
discriminatory practices.
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One particular concern for public
employers given the current economic
recession is reductions-in-force. Often, reductions-in-force proceed as
follows: (1) the employer asks
managers to evaluate candidates for
reduction in several categories such as
experience and skill, (2) the employer
creates a preliminary list of those to be
laid off, (3) the employer runs
statistical analyses to detect whether
the tentative reduction plan would
disparately impact those in protected
classes, and (4) the employer “subtly”
encourages managers to reconsider
their earlier ratings in the event that
the numbers suggest a disparate
impact. The reason is simple: the
threat of class action disparate impact
lawsuits far outweigh the risk that a
non-minority might sue. Given Ricci,
such post-hoc manipulation of the
numbers carries much more risk.
Public employers need to be very
careful about how they structure
reductions.

VI. Conclusion
The fall-out from Ricci is not over.
Public employers continue to face
disparate impact claims over testing
processes. They now have a defense to
taking controversial actions to avoid
feared discrimination claims, but as
the dissent notes it may be very hard to
prove. Someone is going to have to
litigate the parameters of the defense –
and eventually the courts will have to
set some clear guidelines for employers
X
to follow.
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1. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (June 29, 2009).
2. At least if one reads the majority
opinion. The dissent claims the City's
test had “multiple flaws,” that
“[f]irefighting is a profession in which
the legacy of racial discrimination
casts a long shadow,”the City “pervasively discriminated against minorities,” and that it had been the subject
of a discrimination lawsuit and resulting settlement agreement in 1975. Id.
at 2690-91. Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, claims the record allegedly contained evidence that could
lead a jury to find that the City’s disparate impact concern was pretextual:
The City really scrapped the test to
please a politically important racial
constituency. Id. at 2684.
3. Id. at 2665.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2665-66.
7. Id. at 2666.
8. Id. at 2666, 2678.
9. Id. at 2678; 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(2008) (selection rate that is less than
80 percent “of the rate for the group
with the highest rate will generally be
regarded by the Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of ad-verse impact”).
10. 129 S. Ct. at 2666.
11. Id. at 2667-2670.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2668-69.
14. Id. at 2669.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2664.
17. Id. at 2670-71.
18. Ricci v. Destefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d
142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006) aff’d per curiam, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), Reh’g
en banc denied, 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
19. Id. at 161.
20. 530 F.3d at 87.
21. 530 F.3d at 88 (7-6 decision denying rehearing en banc).
22. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion, with Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and
Alito joining. 129 S. Ct at 2664-2681.
Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, as
did Alito, which Scalia and Thomas
joined. Id at 2681-2683. Ginsburg
filed the dissent, which Stevens,
Souter and Breyer joined. Id. at 26892710.
23. In so doing, the Court declined to
rule on the Equal Protection claims.
Id. at 2681.
24. Id. at 2673.
25. Id. at 2674.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2674-75.
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29. Id. at 2675; Civil Rights Act of
1991, PUB. L. NO. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 (1991).
30. Id. at 2675.
31. Id. at 2675 (citing Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed.,
476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
32. 129 S. Ct. at 2676 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 2677.
34. Id. at 2678.
35. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A),
(C).
36. 129 S. Ct. at 2678.
37. Id. at 2679-81.
38. Id. at 2681.
39. Id. at 2699.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 2700-01.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2701-02.
44. Id. at 2703.
45. Id. at 2704-05.
46. Id. at 2706.
47. Id. at 2707.
48. 637 F. Supp.2d 77 (E.D.N.Y. July
22, 2009).
49. Id. at 83-84 (emphasis in original).
50. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74221 (August 20, 2009).
51. Id. at *17-19, 26, 35-36, 37.
52. Id. at *19-25.
53. The record does not indicate
whether the decision actually had issued prior to the status.
54. Id. at *38-41.
55. Id. at *41.
56. Id. at *44-45.
57. Id. at *43.
58. 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
59. Id. at 2677.
60. 129 S. Ct. at 2681 (emphasis
added).
61. Id. at 2676.
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Recent
Developments
Recent Developments is a regular feature
of The Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal develop-

and where the parties' bargaining
history indicated that the employer
had specifically refused to adopt such a
requirement. The Appellate Court
remanded the case to the IELRB to
remand to the arbitrator, with
instructions to not apply a “just case”
requirement and to fashion a remedy,
finding that the arbitrator had failed
to properly considered Harrisburg.

ments of interest to the public employment
relations community. This issue focuses on
developments

under

the

two collective

Failure to Comply with Arbitration Award Ruling Upheld

bargaining statutes and the equal employment opportunity laws.

IELRA Developments
Failure to Comply with Arbitration Award Ruling Reversed
In Griggsville-Perry Federation of
Support Personnel v. IFT-AFT, Local
No. 4141, No. 2009-CA-0027-S (IELRB
2009), the IELRB reversed and
remanded to the arbitrator an ALJ's
decision that Griggsville-Perry Community Unit School District No. 4
("District") violated the IELRA by
refusing to comply with a binding
arbitration award.
On September 11, 2009, the ALJ
issued a Recommended Decision and
Order, concluding that the arbitration
award – which had ordered reinstatement of an employee – after the
arbitrator found her dismissal to be
"procedurally and substantively arbitrary," was binding. The District filed
exceptions, arguing that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority under
the CBA by imposing a "reasonable
cause" standard for discharge where
none had been bargained. The District
cited Board of Educ. of Harrisburg
Community Unit School District No.
3 v. IELRB, 277 Ill. App. 3d 208 (4th
Dist. 1992), in which the Appellate
Court found that an arbitrator had
exceeded his authority by requiring
"just cause" for dismissal where the
CBA contained no such requirement

In Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers #197 v. Illinois State
University, Case No. 2009-CA-0001-S,
the IELRB upheld the Administrative
Law Judge's (ALJ) determination that
Illinois State University (ISU) violated the IELRA by failing to comply
with a binding arbitration award and
that IBEW was not entitled to
attorney's fees.
IBEW filed a grievance against
ISU alleging non-compliance with the
collective bargaining agreement
("Agreement"). The grievance proceeded to arbitration pursuant to the
procedures outlined in the Agreement.
The arbitrator ruled in favor of IBEW
and ordered ISU to give specific
assignments to electricians, instead of
repair workers. One month after the
decision, ISU informed IBEW that it
would not comply with the arbitrator's
decision and IBEW promptly filed an
unfair labor practice charge.
The IELRB concluded that ISU
violated Sections 14(a)(8) and, derivatively, 14(a)(1) and that the ALJ had
properly rejected the University's four
defenses to non-compliance with the
arbitration award. The Board cited
the United States Supreme Court for
the proposition that when the parties
have contracted to have disputes
settled by an arbitrator, a court cannot
simply reject an arbitrator's decision
simply because it disagrees. United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO
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v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38
(1987). The Board also stated that
illinois courts consistently refer to
public policy rationales for favoring
resolution of collective bargaining
disputes through arbitration.
(“[B]ecause the parties have chosen by
contractual agreement how their
dispute is to be decided, and judicial
modification of an arbitrator's decision
deprives parties of their choice.”)
AFSCME v. Dept. of Central Mgm't
Services, 173 Ill.2d 299, 671 N.E.2d
668 (1996). The IELRB considers the
following to determine whether Section 14(a)(8) has been violated: (1)
whether there is a binding arbitration
award; (2) the content of the award,
and (3) whether there has been
compliance with the award.
IELRB ordered a cease and desist
and affirmatively ordered ISU to (1)
comply with the arbitration award; (2)
make the electricians whole (with
interest at a rate of seven percent); (3)
make available to the Board copies of
records and reports necessary to
analyze the amount due; (4) post for
sixty days a 'Notice to Employees' of
the Order; and (5) report in writing
within thirty-five days the steps taken
to comply with the order.
Despite upholding the arbitration
award, the Board affirmed denial of
IBEW's motion for attorney's fees. The
Board stated that attorney's fees are
granted only in “egregious circumstances” and such sanctions had been
ordered only three times in the last 25
years. The Board agreed with the ALJ
that ISU's reasons for non-compliance
did not amount to frivolous litigation,
even though its defenses were not
meritorious.
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IPLRA Developments
Police Sergeants Found to be
Public Employees
In Metropolitan Alliance of Police,
Sergeants Chapter No. 534 and
Village of Oak Brook, No. S-RC-09-057
(ISLRB 2009), the State Panel held
that police officers in the rank of
sergeant were public employees within
the meaning of the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act and certified the
Metropolitan Alliance of Police as their
exclusive representative. The Administrative Law Judge determined that
the sergeants were not excluded under
the Act’s supervisory exemption
because they did not have authority to
perform any of the statutory indicia of
supervisory authority with the requisite independent judgment.The village
filed exceptions.
To qualify as supervisors under the
Act, peace officers must perform work
that is substantially different from
that of subordinates, have authority to
perform at least one of 11 enumerated
supervisory functions, and consistently exercise independent judgment
in connection with supervisory activities. The Village argued, inter alia,
that the sergeants were statutory
supervisors because they had significant discretionary authority to affect
subordinates’ terms and conditions of
employment through performance
evaluations. The ALJ found that the
evaluations had a direct effect on
annual pay increases, but denied that
the sergeants exercised the requisite
independent judgment in completing
the evaluations where they were
jointly prepared by two or three
sergeants or a sergeant and a
lieutenant. Because the evaluations
had to be submitted to Lieutenants in
all cases, sergeants did not exercise
supervisory authority merely by
completing them.
In American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees,
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Council 31 and State of Illinois,
Department of Central Management
Services, No. S-RC-08-036 (ISLRB
2009), the Union filed a representation
petition to represent 1,250 employees
of the Department of Central Management Services ("Employer") in the
classification of Public Service Administrator. The Employer argued that
323 of the employees were excluded
from coverage of the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act under the
exemptions for supervisory, confidential, or managerial employees and that
it was entitled to a hearing on the
matter. Under American Federation
of State, County and Municipal
Employees, Council 31 and State of
Illinois 24 ¶ PERI 112 (IL LRB-SP
2008), if a party before the Board fails
to advance facts that, if proved, would
entitle it to prevail, the Board need not
convene a hearing. Accordingly, the
initial ALJ directed the Employer to
make an offer of proof as to each
disputed employee for the purpose of
determining whether the Employer
could establish a prima facie case for
exclusion so as to warrant a hearing.
The Employer submitted offers as to
102 employees. Thereafter, the Board
directed a representation election, but
the Employer impounded the ballots
pending resolution of the disputed
positions. It then submitted offers of
proof as to the remaining 221 disputed
employees.
The Board agreed with a substituted ALJ that the Employer was
entitled to a hearing as to 74 of the
disputed employees, but it further
found that the Employer had established the existence of questions of fact
or law warranting a hearing as to the
exempt status of another six of the
disputed employees. Because the offers
of proof regarding the remaining 243
disputed employees did not make out a
prima facie case for exclusion, the
Board held that the Employer was not
entitled to hearing regarding the
exempt status of those employees.
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Timeliness of Filings with the
Board
In the consolidated cases, Yurevich
and State of Illinois, Department of
Central Management Services, Case
No. S-CA-09-058 (ILRB State Panel,
2009) and Pugh and State of Illinois,
Department of Central Management
Services S-CA-09-062 (ILRB State
Panel, 2009), the State Panel
addressed the procedural issue of
timeliness in filings with the Board.
The Board upheld an ALJ’s decision
finding that the Department of
Central Management Services (“State”)
had violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act
by discharging the charging parties.
The ALJ found that the State had
defaulted by filing its answer to the
charging parties' complaint two days
late. The ALJ accepted the admissions
set forth in the complaint as true,
concluded that the State had violated
the Act, and ordered that the charging
parties be reinstated.
The State filed exceptions arguing
that the ALJ abused her discretion
because a two day delay did not
prejudice the complaining parties and
also that the ALJ should have granted
a variance under Section 1200.160 of
the Board’s rules. The Board rejected
both exceptions noting that there were
no “extraordinary circumstances”
which would have justified the State's
delay. Specifically, the Board faulted
the State for failing to attach proof of
service to its answer and for using the
State's internal mail system instead of
the U.S. Postal Service, thereby
making it “virtually impossible to
ascertain” when the answer was
actually mailed.
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Status Quo During Interest
Arbitration
In International Association of Fire
Fighters, Local 95 and Village of Oak
Park, Case No. S-CA-07-085 (ILRB
State Panel, 2009), the State Panel
upheld an ALJ's order dismissing an
unfair labor practice complaint alleging a unilateral change in a
mandatory subject of bargaining in
violation of Sections 10(a)(4) and 14(l)
of the Act. IAFF, Local 95 (“Union”)
alleged that the Village of Oak Park
(“Village”) violated the Act when
during the pendency of interest
arbitration it unilaterally, and without notice to the Union, ceased paying
a 15 percent longevity benefit.
The Village argued that it was
justified in suspending payment of the
longevity benefit based on the terms of
an interest arbitration award, which
specifically provided that if a third
party with jurisdiction were to find the
longevity payment was not considered
wages for purposes of calculating
pension benefits, the benefit would
revert back to the terms outlined in a
prior contract. The arbitration award
indicated that such a reversion was
only a remote possibility. However in
2007, the Village actively solicited,
and ultimately received, an opinion
from the Illinois Department of
Financial and Professional Regulation
(“IDFPR”) which found that treating
the 15 percent longevity bonus as
salary was in fact inconsistent with
the pension code, thereby triggering
the reversionary language in the
parties’ interest arbitration award.
The Board acknowledged that
under Sections 10(a)(4) and 14(l) the
parties were required to maintain the
status quo while at impasse, and
throughout the period of impasse, in
terms of the procedures outlined in
Section 14 of the Act for security
employees such as firefighters. However, the Board found no merit in the
Union's claims that surreptitiously
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obtaining the 2007 opinion letter
violated the duty to bargain. Similarly, the Board found that adherence
to the terms of the arbitration award
could not be viewed as disturbing the
status quo. Therefore, despite the
apparent bad faith on the part of the
Village, the Union’s charges were
dismissed.
Seventh Circuit Employment
Law Update
In Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010),
the Seventh Circuit considered whether
a plaintiff may establish liability
under the ADA by proof that the
employer was motivated by both
lawful and unlawful reasons. The
court held that the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129
S.Ct. 2343 (2009), foreclosed mixedmotive analysis in the ADA context.
In Gross, the Supreme Court held
that because Congress failed to amend
the ADEA to explicitly authorize
recovery under a mixed-motive theory
in age discrimination claims when it
amended Title VII to permit such
recovery, proof that age was simply a
motivating factor in an employer's
decision could not suffice to establish
liability under the ADEA. The Seventh
Circuit in Serwatka read Gross to
suggest that when an anti-discrimination statute lacks language authorizing mixed-motive recovery, such
claims are not viable under that
statute. Because there was no provision in the ADA akin to Title VII's
mixed-motive provision, the court held
that the ADA renders employers liable
for age discrimination only to
plaintiffs who prove "but for" causation between the adverse employment
action and the plaintiff's actual or
perceived disability. The court rejected the argument that ADA §
12117(a), granting plaintiffs the same
"powers, remedies, and procedures set
forth in [Title VII §§ 2000e-4 - 2000e-
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9]," permitted a court to crossreference Title VII's mixed-motive
liability provision. The court reasoned
that "although [§ 12117(a)] cross
references the remedies set forth in
[Title VII] for mixed-motives cases, it
does not cross reference [Title VII §
2000e-2(m)], which renders employers
liable for mixed-motive employment
decisions." 591 F.3d 957 at 962
(original emphasis).
Applying the "but for" causation
requirement, the Seventh Circuit
vacated the district court's award of
declaratory and injunctive relief,
along with a portion of attorney's fees
and costs, since the award was based
solely the jury's mixed-motive finding.
In Serafinn v. Local 722, Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5279 (7th Cir. 2010), the
Seventh Circuit reviewed for abuse of
discretion a United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois rejection of Local 722's
proposed jury instruction that would
permit the Local to avoid liability for
impairing the free speech rights of an
ex-president if it could show that it
would have disciplined him even if he
had not engaged in protected speech.
The Seventh Circuit held that the
district court committed no prejudicial
error in rejecting the instruction and
requiring the ex-president to prove
that "but for" his exercise of free
speech, he would not have been
disciplined.
Serafinn was a three term
president of a Local of the “Teamsters
for a Democratic Union.” a "dissident
faction" opposing the leadership of the
International's current president,
James P. Hoffa. He claimed that his
opponent in the 2001 election and the
region's joint council president colluded
to bring internal disciplinary charges
against him for violating union rules
by referring himself to a power plant
job ahead of others on the Local's list,
when their real motive was to punish
him for meeting with local union
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executives and publishing a newsletter critical of his opponent. The Local
argued that the discipline was solely
for violations of the union's workreferral rules.
A jury found that the Local had
retaliated against the ex-president for
exercising free speech in violation of
the Landrum-Griffin Act, and awarded
$50,000 in compensatory and $55,000
in punitive damages. The Local
appealed, arguing that it was error
to reject its "'mixed motive' jury
instruction."
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, finding that
because the court rejected the
Serafinn’s proposed motivating-factor
instruction, the Local's proposed
liability-limiting mixed-motive instruction was not significant. Citing
the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343, (2009), for
the proposition that shifting the
burden of persuasion is not permitted
unless authorized by express statutory
language, the Seventh Circuit held
that because the district court was not
allowed to alter the burden because not
so-authorized by the Landrum-Griffin
Act, its discretion was appropriately
confined.
In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, the Supreme Court held
that the Seventh Circuit erred in
holding that the National Railroad
Adjustment Board violated constitutional due process by dismissing sua
sponte five employees' claims. 130
S.Ct. 584 (Dec. 8, 2009) (affirming
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region
v. Union Pacific R.R., 522 F.3d 746
(7th Cir. 2008). A split panel of the
NRAB had dismissed the employees'
claims because there was no proof in
the record to satisfy the Railway Labor
Act's requirement of pre-arbitration
"conferencing."
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The RLA imposes conferencing as
an intermediate step in its minor
dispute resolution process before the
parties proceed to arbitration. The
NRAB found this requirement was
jurisdictional in nature, could not be
waived, and therefore dismissed the
employees' complaints. The union
brought a claim in the Northern
District of Illinois to vacate the
NRAB's award arguing that the
conference requirement under the
RLA was not jurisdictional and had in
fact been waived by the employer.
The district court dismissed the
union's complaint, the 7th Circuit
reversed the dismissal, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment—but on statutory rather than
constitutional grounds. The Supreme
Court specifically declined to resolve a
constitutional question which has
split the circuit courts of appeal:
whether the federal courts have
jurisdiction to review NRAB proceedings for due process violations.
The Court reasoned that reaching
that constitutional issue was not
appropriate in this case because in
section 152 of the RLA Congress had
granted the NRAB jurisdiction to
adjudicate grievances of railroad
employees that remain unsettled after
pursuit of internal procedures. The
conferencing requirement, which appears in section 153 of the RLA, was
only a "claim processing rule" and not
a jurisdictional limitation. Because
the NRAB does not have authority to
decline the jurisdiction granted to it by
Congress, the Court found that the
NRAB's dismissal of the employee's
claims on jurisdictional grounds
clearly violated the express language
of the RLA which requires the board
"to conform, or confine itself, to
matters within the scope of [its]
jurisdiction."
In reaching this conclusion the
Court found that the regulations
promulgated by the NRAB and the
prior decisions of the NRAB, which
suggested that the conferencing
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requirement may be jurisdictional in
nature, were not controlling because
"Congress alone controls the Board's
jurisdiction," and "Congress gave the
Board no authority to adopt rules of
jurisdictional dimension."
In O'Neal v. City of Chicago Police
Dept., 588 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. Nov. 17,
2009), a female police officer ("O'Neal")
sued the Chicago Police Department
("CPD") under Title VII after being
transferred out of the Narcotics unit,
alleging race and gender discrimination. As part of a settlement of a
dispute over the collective bargaining
agreement, O'Neal was later transferred back into the Narcotics unit,
but was subsequently transferred an
additional ten times among various
units. In 2007, O'Neal once again filed
suit against the CPD, alleging that the
transfers were in retaliation for her
2002 law suit, and as well filed a
charge of sex discrimination with the
EEOC. The district court entered
summary judgment on the CPD's
behalf, which O'Neal appealed. The
appellate court affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment,
noting that in both her retaliation and
discrimination charges, her charges
were time-barred except as to her two
most recent transfers.
With regards to her retaliation
claim, while the court found that
O'Neal had sufficiently alleged the
first two prongs of a prima facie case —
that she had engaged in protected
activity by filing suit in 2002 and
again by filing a grievance in 2006 and
that she had suffered an adverse action
taken by the CPD in the form of her
transfers-the court found that O'Neal
had failed to present sufficient
evidence that she had been transferred
because of her protection actions. The
court found that under the direct
method of proof, the evidence presented, in the form of statements from
her Lieutenant calling her a "complainer" and other similar names, and
a previous statement by the same
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Lieutenant referring to O'Neal as
having previously "dated a gang
banger," did not amount to direct
evidence when made without reference
to O'Neal's protected actions. The
court also found that O'Neal did not
present sufficient evidence to fulfill the
third prong under the indirect method
of proof. The court noted that under
this method, O'Neal needed to present
evidence that she met the CPD's
legitimate expectations, that she was
treated less favorably than similarly
situated employees who did not engage
in protected activity, and that any
nondiscriminatory reasons for the
CPD's adverse actions were pretextual.
The court found that O'Neal was
unable to provide sufficient evidence
that she was meeting the CPD's
legitimate expectations, because she
failed to rebut the CPD's assertions
that she was borderline insubordinate,
had a confrontational attitude, and
suffered from an inability to conduct
street operations.
The court also found that O'Neal's
sex discrimination charge failed
because she was similarly unable to
demonstrate a causal connection.

Continued Confusion as to
Meaning of Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act of 2009
Courts continue to struggle with the
proper interpretation of the Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009. The Act– the
first piece of substantive legislation
signed into law during the Obama
administration– clearly overruled the
Supreme Court's 2007 decision in
Ledbetter v Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 127 S. Ct 2162 (2007) which had
held that a plaintiff who claimed
unequal pay caused by long-ago
discriminatory performance evaluations could not base such a claim upon
previous time-barred acts. Yet the
new law's scope remains unclear as to
its application to a wide array of
employment practices that directly or
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indirectly result in continued unequal
pay.
The differing interpretations stem
from the statute's ambiguous phrase
"a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice" which affects an
employee's salary. The question with
which the federal courts have been
struggling is whether the "other
practice" attacked by the employee
must itself be a practice related to the
setting of compensation, as opposed to
some other act (i.e a demotion, failure
to promote, reassignment, etc.) that
has merely an indirect relation to the
employee's compensation.
Many of the cases decided under the
Act to date have concerned the
troublesome issue of whether a
plaintiff can claim unequal pay due to
a long-ago promotion denial. After all,
an employee who failed to obtain a
promotion ten years in the past may
still, today, be receiving lower wages
than if he or she had gained the
promotion. The first appellate court
decision to address the promotion issue
is Schuler v PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
LLP, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2998
(D.C. Cir. 2010. There, the D.C Cir
held that the employer's long-ago
failure to promote the plaintiff to
partner did not constitute "a compensation decision or other practice"
within the meaning of the new Act.
The Court reasoned that "In employment law, the phrase ‘discrimination
in compensation' means paying
different wages or providing different
benefits to similarly situated employees, not promoting one employee but
not another to a more remunerative
position." Id. at 9-10.
The dispute is far from resolved,
however, because district courts have
split on the issue. For example, in
Gentry v. Jackson State University,
610 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. Miss. 2009), the
Court held that a professor's timebarred claim of denial of tenure did not
prevent him from alleging unequal
pay at present. Similarly, a Florida
court has held that lower pay caused
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by a demotion that occurred 16 years
in the past was actionable under the
Act. Bush v. Orange County Corrections Department, 597 F. Supp. 1293
(M.D. Fla. 2009).
Particularly troublesome for employers will be factual situations such
as that involved in Mikula v Allegheny
County, 583 F. Supp. 181 (3d Cir.
2009). There, the Third Circuit held
that the employee's unanswered
request for a raise creates a perpetual
cause of action under the new Act.
Thus, informal requests for a raise or
better job assignment may be seen as
constituting an "other practice" under
the new Act that provides a neverending cause of action for employees to
challenge unequal pay.
X
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